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Abstract
Since China’s merger control regime under the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) 
was established in 2008, the enforcement record has given rise to growing con-
cern that the system is inherently biased against foreign multinationals. This article 
conducts an analysis of the evolution of China’s merger review system to assess 
this charge and its implications. China’s steady economic development fueled by 
foreign investment has led to a domestic market featuring strong foreign presence. 
Foreign-domestic competition figured as an important issue for the policymakers, 
especially in anticipation of China’s entry into the WTO. This concern precipitated 
the establishment in 2003 of the country’s first merger review system, which only 
applied to M&As by and between foreign companies. Although the AML on its 
face applies generally to both foreign and Chinese firms, enforcement authorities 
have only intervened in foreign takeovers. China’s merger control regime is diffe-
rent from that of mature market economies and has significant implications for 
itself as well as foreign investors. 
Keywords: China. Merger control. Global integration. Foreign-domestic competition
1 Introduction
Since China began to implement the Reform and Opening-Up Policy in 
1978, it has engaged in an unprecedented undertaking of overhauling its legal sys-
tem in order to facilitate and adapt to its stellar economic growth. Of the large 
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number of changes and developments that have taken place in this area, the merger 
review system is a rather recent addition to China’s legal infrastructure. In 2003 the 
Provisional Regulations on Mergers with and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by 
Foreign Investors (“Provisional M&A Regulations”) was adopted, containing in it a 
nascent antitrust mechanism to regulate only those M&As by and between foreign 
investors.2 It was not until the Anti-Monopoly Law (“AML”)3 entered into force in 
August 2008, that China introduced a fully-fledged merger control regime that 
applies generally to both foreign and Chinese companies4.
From the beginning of its brief existence under the AML, however, China’s 
merger review regime has been subject to close scrutiny and extensive debate. To a 
large extent this reflects the enormous interest in the AML generally, which, after 
13 strenuous years of efforts to draft, is hailed as a significant landmark in China’s 
gradual transition from central planning to a market economy. Merger review, to-
gether with provisions prohibiting cartels and abuse of dominant market position, 
constitute the three basic “pillars” of the AML. But more importantly, wide-spread 
public attention has been caused because authorities have taken an activist appro-
ach to merger enforcement that seemingly target foreign investors in particular. 
During two years after the merger review system was established under the AML, 
the enforcement agency approved six mergers subject to restrictive conditions and 
blocked one merger, all of which involved foreign multinational companies. 
In developed market economies such as the U.S., antitrust regimes inclu-
ding merger review systems were established to address competition issues in a 
market composed almost exclusively of domestic firms. In contrast, under the bro-
2 ARTICLES 19-22. M&A Regulations. Available at: <http://www.chin acc.com/new/63/159/ 
177/2006/1/wa333914728211600220049-0.htm>. Access on: 17 Aug. 2010. 
3 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau. The anti-monopoly law of the people’s Republic of China, adopted by the 29th 
Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress on 30 Aug. 
2007, and promulgated by Presidential Order No. 68. Available at: <http://www.gov.cn/
ziliao/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.htm>. Access on: 17 Aug. 2010.
4 See Chapter VI of AML, which is entitled “control of concentrations”. For the purpose of 
the discussion in this article, “merger control” is used interchangeably with “control of 
concentrations”. 
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ad context of globalization and after more than two decades of rapid economic 
development fueled by international trade and foreign investment, China had very 
different market conditions and competition landscape when its first merger con-
trol legislation was adopted. Foreign dominance in many sectors posed formidable 
competitive threat to Chinese firms, while the government had long prioritized 
the expansion of domestic companies, especially the State-Owned-Enterprises 
(“SOEs”). Inevitably a major concern for the Chinese authorities is the foreign-
-domestic competition, which has remained an underlying policy issue during the 
entire development of China’s merger control system.
This article explores the features of China’s merger control regime and as-
sesses its implications, in light of China’s integration with the world economy in 
the period of globalization. It reviews the historical background when the merger 
review component was first conceived, explains the early legislation of the merger 
review system, and provides an analysis of the existing merger review regime and 
law enforcement activities.
2 Background: the globalization impetus
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 started a new era for its integration 
into the rest of the world economy. As China’s market opened up further to the 
world, a legitimate concern arose about whether Chinese companies could com-
pete with foreign firms, and whether China’s many fledging industries could fare 
well or even survive. 
At the time, most Chinese business entities were still small and weak. Even 
China’s large, industrial companies were relatively small when put in the context of 
the global market. In 2002, China had only eleven firms listed in Fortune’s Global 
500,5 all of which operated under a protected domestic environment and enjoyed 
5 SEE HU QIANGJIN: Eleven Chinese Firms on the Fortune Global 500 List, 20 jul. 2002. 
Available at: < http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20020720/234876.html>. Access on: 30 Nov. 
2010.
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preferential treatment as large SOEs; half of them prospered as monopolies or oli-
gopolies. Five of the biggest employers in the Global 500 were Chinese companies, 
which indicated serious inefficiency and downsizing problems. Furthermore, des-
pite countless reform efforts, Chinese enterprises were still vulnerable to interna-
tional competition in most sectors. No Chinese firm was qualified as a global giant 
corporation, and the daunting difficulties in SOE reform and economic transition 
seemed to continue to dim that prospect.
Due to China’s WTO commitments, however, the large Chinese firms were 
soon to find themselves competing with multinational firms on a global level. Chi-
na had promised to fully open up an array of protected sectors after relatively short 
grace periods. At the same time, because of global economic slowdown and China’s 
steady growth, foreign companies had also intensified their efforts to penetrate the 
Chinese market. More than 400 of the Fortune Global 500 companies have made 
investments in China, and approximately 110 of them established study and design 
centers in China.6 Two-thirds of the world’s largest fifty retailers established busi-
ness in China one year after China joined the WTO.7 These are just a few exam-
ples of China’s changing role in the multinational firms’ global strategy: transition 
from merely a large potential market to the world’s manufacturing factory. A few 
trends in foreign direct investment had confirmed this transition around 2001, 
including diversification of investment structure, localization of management and 
use of more advanced technology.8 One notable change was the increase of wholly 
6 SAN FENG. China's development: win-win instead of threat, Jingji Can Kao bao. 12 feb. 
2003. Available at: <http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jinji/36/20030212/921890.html>. 
Access on: 15 Nov. 2010. 
 Jingji Can Kao bao. 12 feb. 2003. Available at: <http:// www.people. com.cn/GB/
jinji/36/20030212/921890.html>. Access on: 21 oct. 2010.
7 SEE QIU JU. One year after accession to WTO (2002). Working report by State 
Administration of Industry and Commerce of China. Beijing, Issues 03, Feb. 2003.
8 NEW trends in foreign investment in China by multinational companies. Working paper 
of Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. Beijing, Issues 11, Jul. 2002.
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foreign-owned enterprises and decrease of joint ventures.9 Foreign investors were 
also showing a growing interest in mergers and acquisitions as a channel for expan-
sion rather than joint ventures since 2002. This was clearly an indication of foreign 
firms’ elevated confidence in their long-term presence in China. 
Chinese leaders were fully aware of the double-edged nature of the forese-
eable intensification of competition in China’s home market. While policy makers 
had counted on competition to improve the performance of domestic firms and 
boost economic growth, they were increasingly concerned that foreign firms might 
“muscle in” too swiftly and become monopoly powers before the Chinese enterpri-
ses were well-established. Foreign conglomerates with superior technical expertise, 
efficient management and ample capital possessed a formidable power sufficient to 
crush many of China’s fledgling industries. Early signs had given some foundation 
to this fear. Foreign companies already dominated the markets of computers, ca-
bles, sedan cars, rubber, switchboards, beer, paper, elevators, pharmaceuticals, and 
detergent, among other products.10 In some areas mergers and acquisitions with 
the purpose of obtaining a larger market share were noted.11
In anticipation of WTO obligations to reduce trade barriers, China recog-
nized the importance of putting into place a viable legal mechanism to address 
competition ramifications. In October 2001, on the eve of the WTO accession, the 
Chinese government pledged to enact or revise “a series of laws in compliance with 
WTO rules to preserve fair competition and protect domestic industries,” including 
specifically an anti-monopoly law.12 Other rules included on this list, the Anti-Dum-
9 According to Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation statistics, joint-equity 
ventures decreased 4.74% in 2002 from the previous year and cooperative joint ventures 
dropped 18.59%, while wholly foreign-owned enterprises increased by 32.87%. There 
were 22,173 newly-established, wholly foreign-owned enterprises in 2002, comprising 
65% of the 34,171 newly-established FDI enterprises that year. 
10 LU JIONG XING (ed.). Studies of China’s foreign investment law. Beijing: China Law Press, 
2001. p. 167.
11 For example, Kodak’s merger with two Chinese firms in 1998 led to its 70% market share 
in film products in 2001. 
12 STATE economic & trade commission: guidelines of the industry structure adjustment for 
the tenth five-year plan. oct. 2001. Available at: <http://code.fabao365.com/law_248738_1.
html>. Access on: 30 Nov. 2010.
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ping, Anti-Subsidy and Safeguard Regulations were enacted shortly afterwards,13 
which China prepared itself to use fully whenever possible.14 The envisioned anti-
-monopoly law, with fundamental and far-reaching implications for competition 
and market order, had thus become a top priority on the legislative agenda. 
3 The embryonic stage: wariness toward foreign acquirers
As early as 1987, a working group on drafting the anti-monopoly law was 
established under the Legislative Affairs Bureau of the State Council. In 1994, the 
8th National People’s Congress included the anti-monopoly law in its legislative 
plan. However, the drafting of an entire package of law met with great difficulty due 
to the many controversial issues involved, particularly those on state monopolies 
and government distortion of market competition.
When WTO membership raised pressing concerns on foreign competition, 
the Chinese decision-makers seemingly sought to address this immediate issue in 
part by introducing first a merger control scheme that only regulated M&A ac-
tivities of foreign investors. This was done by quietly inserting four articles in the 
2003 Provisional M&A Regulations.15 The passage of the Provisional M&A Regu-
lations, a departmental regulation, was much easier than that of a comprehensive 
anti-monopoly statute. Contained in a set of foreign investment provisions those 
articles were also inconspicuous, until the adoption of the 2006 amended M&A 
Regulations, in which the four articles essentially remained unchanged but formed 
a separate and distinctive chapter entitled “anti-monopoly review”.
Despite of such a modest start in terms of legislation, the four articles by 
themselves constituted a sufficiently operational merger control regime that was 
shortly put into implementation. Notably this scheme was largely independent 
13 The three regulations were adopted on 31 oct. 2001 and became effective on 1 jan. 2002.
14 YOUNGJIN JUNG. China’s aggressive legalism. China’s First Safeguard Measure. Journal 
of World Trade, Netherlands, v. 36, n. 6, 2002. p. 1037-1060.
15 ARTICLES 19-22. M&A Regulations. Available at: <http://www.chinaacc.com/ 
new/63/159/ 177/2006/1/wa333914728211600220049-0.htm>. Access on: 15 Nov. 2010. 
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from the M&A Regulations, to which it was built into. The other provisions in this 
regulation set out regulatory requirements and procedures regarding only M&As 
by foreign investors of domestic firms in China, while the merger review rules ap-
plied to both those transactions and offshore M&As that affected Chinese market. 
The latter obviously fell outside the stated scope of the M&A Regulations, but in 
practice it turned out that they made up the majority of transactions notified to the 
authorities. 
Two central government agencies, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (“MOFTEC”) and State Administration for Industry and Commerce 
(“SAIC”) shared enforcement jurisdiction according to the regulation.16 But short-
ly afterwards, before MOFTEC allocated staff to this work, it was replaced by the 
Ministry of Commerce (“MOFCOM”) following a government reorganization. For 
the same transaction, notifying parties normally submitted identical documents to 
both agencies. Each conducted review and investigation separately without con-
sulting or coordinating with each other. Merger review process was considered 
complete when both authorities had made their decisions. 
Respective notification thresholds were established for M&As inside and 
outside China. For transactions inside China involving foreign investors acquiring 
domestic firms, if any of the following conditions were met, the investors should 
notify MOFCOM and SAIC: (1) the annual turnover of one party in the Chinese 
market exceeds RMB 1.5 billion; (2) more than 10 firms in relevant industries in 
China have been acquired within one year; (3) one party has a market share of 
at least 20% in China; and (4) as a result of the transaction, the market share of 
one party reaches 25% in China. In addition, even if those thresholds were not 
met, whenever the enforcement agencies considered it necessary due to concerns 
of large markets share, market competition or national economic security, they had 
the power to request notification by the foreign investors.17 
16 ARTICLES 19-22. M&A Regulations. Available at: <http://www.chinaacc.com/ 
new/63/159/ 177/2006/1/wa333914728211600220049-0.htm>. Access on: 15 Nov. 2010.
17 ARTICLE 19. M&A Regulations. Available at: <http://www.chin acc.com/new/63/159/ 
177/2006/1/wa333914728211600220049-0.htm>. Access on: 15 Nov. 2010. 
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With respect to offshore M&As, in addition to the above (1) (3) and (4) 
thresholds, two other rules also applied: either the total asset value of one party in 
China exceeds RMB 3 billion; or as a result of the transaction, one party is to have 
shareholding in more than 15 firms in relevant industries inside China.18 
At the same time, notifiable transactions could be exempted from merger 
review for the following benefits that might ensue: (1) improvements of condi-
tions for market competition; (2) restructure of failing firms and contribution to 
employment; (3) introduction of advanced technology and managerial expertise, 
and enhancement of firms’ international competitiveness; and (4) environmental 
improvements.19 
Substantive standards were given for enforcement agencies to take into 
consideration in conducting reviews and making decisions, although they were 
in rather general terms such as over-concentration, fair competition, consumer 
welfare, and national economic security.20 There were only a few procedural rules, 
such as that a decision should be made within 90 days after a complete notification 
was filed, and within that period the two enforcement agencies could jointly or 
independently hold hearings and invite participation of relevant government agen-
cies, entities, companies or other stakeholders.21 To put those broad and simple 
rules into implementation, MOFCOM adopted a Guideline of for Anti-monopoly 
Filing for Mergers with and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors 
18 ARTICLE 21. M&A Regulations. Available at: <http://www.chin acc.com/new/63/159/ 
177/2006/1/wa333914728211600220049-0.htm>. Access on: 15 Nov. 2010. 
19 ARTICLE 22. M&A Regulations. Available at: <http://www.chin acc.com/new/63/159/ 
177/2006/1/wa333914728211600220049-0.htm>. Access on: 15 Nov. 2010. ARTICLES 19-
22. M&A Regulations. Available at: <http://www.chin acc.com/new/63/159/ 177/2006/1/
wa333914728211600220049-0.htm>. Access on: 15 nov. 2010.
20 ARTICLES 19, 20. M&A Regulations. Available at: <http://www.chin acc.com/new/63/159/ 
177/2006/1/wa333914728211600220049-0.htm>. Access on: 15 Nov. 2010. ARTICLES 19-
22. M&A Regulations. Available at: <http://www.chin acc.com/new/63/159/ 177/2006/1/
wa333914728211600220049-0.htm>. Access on: 15 nov. 2010.
21 ARTICLE 22. M&A Regulations. Available at: <http://www.chin acc.com/new/63/159/ 
177/2006/1/wa333914728211600220049-0.htm>. Access on: 15 Nov. 2010. ARTICLES 19-
22. M&A Regulations. Available at: <http://www.chin acc.com/new/63/159/ 177/2006/1/
wa333914728211600220049-0.htm>. Access on: 15 Nov. 2010.
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(“Filing Guideline”) with detailed procedural requirements.22 Although the Filing 
Guideline was not legally binding in nature, it provided much-needed guidance 
and predictability for notifying parties and in practice was generally followed. 
The major weakness of this merger control system is the lack of enforce-
ment power possessed by the agencies. The regulation itself was silent as to liabili-
ties for failing to notify a reportable transaction or non-compliance with a decision 
by the agencies to block a deal. Moreover, as merger review was an entirely new 
component to the Chinese legal system, there was no other legislation to which re-
ference could be made. From its establishment in 2003 until 2008 before AML be-
came effective, more than 600 merger notifications were filed with MOFCOM and 
SAIC.23 All decisions ever handed down were clearances and therefore officially 
no transaction was prohibited. However, not all transactions were rubber-stamped 
either. For example, in the high-profile Carlyle/Xugong acquisition, in which Car-
lyle Group, the U.S. private equity firm, initially agreed to acquire 85% of equity 
in Xugong Machinery, parties finally abandoned the transaction when they failed 
in their three-year efforts to obtain a clearance through several revisions of their 
agreements proposing decreases of the to-be-acquired share percentage.24 
4 Merger control under the AML: foreign competition still the focal point 
4.1 The framework
The AML establishes a comprehensive merger control regime that no lon-
ger in itself differentiate between foreign and domestic parties. In fact it has been 
repeatedly emphasized by the authorities that the AML shall be uniformly and 
22 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Available at: <http://
www.winkinglaw.com/ResourceFolder/200873012145256.pdf>. Access on: 15 Nov. 2010.
23 SHANG MING. Government online interview: improving antimonoply enforcement and 
safeguarding fair market competition. 2008. Available at: <http://www.gov.cn/zxft/ft155>. 
Access on: 15 Nov. 2010.
24 CARLYLE’S proposed stake acquisition in xugong falls through. Available at: <http://
www.chinastakes.com/2008/7/carlyles-proposed-stake-acquisition-in-xugong-falls-
through.html>. Access on: 15 Nov. 2010.
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equally applicable to both domestic and foreign enterprises of any nature without 
any discriminatory treatment.25 
MOFCOM was designated as the only enforcement agency for merger con-
trol under the AML.26 An Anti-Monopoly Bureau (“AMB”), consisting of 6 divi-
sions, was established under MOFCOM in September 2008 to perform this func-
tion. In addition to handling merger cases, the AMB is also responsible for drafting 
implementing regulations, rules and guidelines of the AML provisions on merger 
control. Several such documents have been adopted, including the Guidelines on 
the Definition of Relevant Market27 and the Measures on the Review of Concentra-
tions between Undertakings28, contributing the continuous expansion and evolu-
tion of the merger control system. 
As foreshadowed by the AML29, on August 3, 2008, the State Council adop-
ted the Provisions of the Pre-Notification Thresholds for Concentrations between Un-
25 HARRIS JR, H. Stephen; SHUGARMAN, Keith D Interview with Shang Ming, director 
general of the anti-monopoly bureau under the ministry of commerce of the people’s 
Republic of China. Available at: <http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/09/02/
Feb09-ShangIntrvw2-26f.pdf>. Access on: 15 Nov. 2010.
26 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau. Pursuant to the “three designation plan” approved by the state council, 
MOFCOM is responsible for conducting review of concentrations between undertakings 
in accordance with the law. See the description of the function of MOFCOM Anti-
Monopoly Bureau on its official website. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/
gywm/200809/20080905756026.html>. Access on: 18 Nov. 2010. See also THE measures 
on the notification of concentrations of undertakings, MOFCOM order, 2009. Available 
at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/200911/20091106639149.html>. Access on: 18 
Nov. 2010. 
27 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly Bureau . 
News release. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/j/ 200907/20090706384131.
html>. Access on: 18 Nov. 2010.
28 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly Bureau. 
News release. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/200911/20091106639145.
html>. Access on: 18 nov. 2010.
29 ARTICLE 21. The anti-monopoly law of the people’s Republic of China (AML). Available 
at: <http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.htm>. Access on: 17 Aug. 
2010.
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dertakings30, setting up a new set of notification thresholds. According to Article 
3, no merger shall be implemented without prior notification if they reach either 
of the following thresholds: (1) the aggregate worldwide sales revenue during the 
previous fiscal year of all undertakings participating in the concentration exceeds 
RMB 10 billion, and each of at least two of such undertakings’ sales revenue in 
China during the previous fiscal year exceeds RMB 400 million; (2) the aggregate 
sales revenue in China during the previous fiscal year of all undertakings partici-
pating in the concentration exceeds RMB 2 billion, and each of at least two of such 
undertakings’ sales revenue in China during the previous fiscal year exceeds RMB 
400 million.31
Upon the receipt of a complete notification pursuant to Articles 23 and 24, 
MOFCOM initiates a 30-day preliminary review.32 If the agency decides that fur-
ther review is warranted, the investigation will move into second stage, subject to a 
time limit of 90 days and a possible extension of up to another 60 days.33 In conduc-
ting substantive evaluation of the merger, the following factors should considered: 
(1) market shares of parties and their controlling power over the market; (2) the 
degree of market concentration; (3) the impact of the concentration on market ac-
cess and technological progress; (4) the impact of the concentration on consumers 
and other undertakings; (5) the impact of the concentration on national economic 
development; and (6) other elements that affect competition and should be taken 
into account.34
30 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly Bureau. 
News release. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/c/200811/20081105917434.
html>. Access on: 18 Nov. 2010.
31 At the same time, Article 4 provides that: “where a concentration of undertakings does 
not reach any of the thresholds specified in Article 3 of these Provisions, but facts and 
evidence collected in accordance with the prescribed procedures establish that such 
concentration effects, or is likely to effect, the elimination or restriction of competition”, 
the enforcement agency shall initiate an investigation in accordance with law.
32 ARTICLE 25. AML. Available at: <http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.
htm>. Access on: 17 Aug. 2010.
33 ARTICLE 26. AML. Available at: <http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.
htm>. Access on: 17 Aug. 2010.
34 ARTICLE 27. AML. Available at: <http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.
htm>. Access on: 17 Aug. 2010.
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The AML makes clear that after its assessment of the merger the enforcement 
agency can take a decision to clear a merger, to conditionally approve a merger 
or to prohibit a merger.35 Decisions prohibiting a merger or attaching restriction 
conditions to a merger should be published in a timely manner.36 
Legal liabilities for violations of the merger review provisions under the 
AML are specified. If a merger is implemented in violation of the law, the enforce-
ment agency shall order the parties to cease the implementation of the transaction, 
order the divestment of the shares or assets or the transfer of business operations 
within a given time limit, and take other measures necessary to restore the condi-
tions prevailing before the closing. In addition, it may impose a fine of up to RMB 
500,000.37
4.2 Cases
Since the AML merger control regime was established in August 2008, MO-
FCOM has taken an activist approach to merger enforcement. During a period 
of two years, the enforcement agency approved six mergers subject to restrictive 
conditions and blocked one merger. The seven decisions, all published pursuant 
to AML requirement, bear strong testimony to the increased enforceability of the 
merger review regime compared to the previous system, most importantly due to 
the introduction of provisions on the decisions MOFCOM can take and legal lia-
bilities for violations. 
However, although the AML merger review no longer limits its application 
to only transactions involving foreign acquirers, actual enforcement activities see-
ms to suggest that those are still the foremost concern of the Chinese authorities. 
35 ARTICLE 29. AML. Available at: <http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.
htm>. Access on: 17 Aug. 2010. 
36 ARTICLE 30. AML. Available at: <http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.
htm>. Access on: 17 Aug. 2010. 
37 ARTICLE 48. AML. Available at: <http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.
htm>. Access on: 17 Aug. 2010.
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All the seven decisions, as illustrated below, focus on addressing potential negative 
impact as a result of M&As by and between foreign companies. 
4.2.1 InBev/Anheuser-Busch
On November 18, 2008, MOFCOM decided to grant a qualified approval of 
InBev’s acquisition of Anheuser-Busch with certain restrictive conditions attached. 38 
InBev was a global brewer in Belgium and Anheuser-Busch was a leading U.S. beer 
manufacturer. Both had shares in certain Chinese beer producers at the time. 
The InBev/Anheuser-Busch decision is the first conditional approval given 
by MOFCOM in its review of mergers since 2003, and the first decision ever pu-
blished. The restrictive conditions include that the 27% equity interest currently 
held by Anheuser-Busch in Tsingdao Brewery shall not be increased; any change 
to InBev’s controlling shareholder or any change to the shareholders of such con-
trolling shareholder shall be promptly notified to MOFCOM; the 28.56% equity 
interest currently held by InBev in Zhujiang Beer shall not be increased; and no 
effort or attempt shall be made to acquire any shares in China Resources Snow 
Brewery or Beijing Yanjing Brewery. 
In a short announcement by MOFCOM the purpose for those restrictive 
conditions is clearly stated to be “to mitigate any adverse impact that may possibly 
arise on future competition in the Chinese beer market”39, due to the “large size of 
the merger” and given the “high market share” and “substantially increased com-
petitiveness” of the merged entity. Investigation findings, indicated by the announ-
cement and confirmed in the an interview with Director General of AMB (“InBev 
 
38 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau MOFCOM public notice. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/
ztxx/200811/20081105899216.html>. Access on: 18 Nov. 2010.
39 Emphasis added.
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Interview”)40, are that the merger does not eliminate or restrict competition in the 
Chinese beer market.41
In other words, as a threshold issue, no harm to competition is identified in 
this case. Rather, the authorities are concerned about possible “future” harm that 
may materialize only upon further expansion of the merged firm through increase 
of control in China’s major beer manufacturers. It is explained that MOFCOM 
considers those restrictive conditions necessary to pre-empt the potential emer-
gence of anticompetitive market structure as a result of the merger.42 If increase of 
market share alone is taken as the negative effect on competition, it is inconsistent 
with MOFCOM’s view that growth of company in itself is not considered anticom-
petitive.43 Implicitly, anticompetitive market structure here refers to one in which 
the growth of foreign companies squeeze out domestic competitors.
4.2.2 Coca Cola/Huiyuan
On March 18, 2009, MOFCOM announced its decision to reject the propo-
sed bid by Coca Cola Corp of the entire shares of Huiyuan Juice Group, the largest 
juice maker and a household brand in China.44 Among the seven cases, this is the 
40 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau The InBev interview. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/ aarticle/
zcfb/200812/20081205935637.html>. Access on: 18 Nov. 2010.
41 The decision only states that the merger is “not prohibited in accordance with Article 28 
of AML.” But in the InBev interview, DG Shang Ming explained that “[…] as investigation 
findings show that this merger does not have the effect of eliminating or restricting 
competition in the Chinese beer market, MOFCOM has decided not to prohibit it […]” 
42 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau The InBev interview. Supra note 40. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/ 
aarticle/zcfb/200812/20081205935637.html>. Access on: 18 nov. 2010. 
43 At the end of the InBev Interview, DG Shang Ming emphasized that “the purpose of the 
anti-monopoly review of concentrations between undertakings is not to curb the growth 
of enterprise size, but to avoid the anticompetitive effects resulting from such size increase 
[…]” See supra note 40.
44 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau MOFCOM public notice. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/
ztxx/200903/20090306108494.html>. Access on: 18 Nov. 2010.
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only one that involves a contemplated takeover by a foreign company of a Chinese 
firm, and so far it remains the only merger that has been blocked by MOFCOM.
MOFCOM’s decision was based on affirmative findings of negative effects 
that the merger would cause. Firstly, it was concerned that the acquisition of 
Huiyuan would enable Coca Cola to leverage its dominant position in the carbona-
ted soft drinks market into the juice beverage market. Secondly, the control of two 
well-known brands (“Minute Maid” and “Huiyuan”), in addition to Coca Cola’s 
dominant position and the leverage effect, would raise entry barriers to the juice 
beverage market to potential competitors. Thirdly, the acquisition would squeeze 
out smaller juice manufactures in China, restrain the abilities of local producers to 
participate in competition and innovation in the juice market, and therefore harm 
the competition in the Chinese juice beverage market and undermine its sustained 
and healthy development. 
Although the decision refers to “consumer welfare” and “entry barrier”, it 
elaborates more on concerns relating to domestic firms in its reasoning. Although 
remedy proposals had been first discussed, eventually none were accepted by MO-
FCOM as sufficient to address those identified concerns.
4.2.3 Mitsubishi Rayon/Lucite
On April 24, 2009, MOFCOM announced its decision to conditionally 
approve Japanese chemical giant Mitsubishi Rayon’s planned purchase of British-
-based Lucite.45 According to the decision, the proposed transaction would give 
the merged entity a combined share of 64% in the Chinese methyl methacrylate 
(“MMA”) market, significantly larger than those of its competitors. MOFCOM was 
concerned that the dominant position would enable the merged firm to eliminate 
or restrict competitors in China’s MMA market. In addition, as Mitsubishi Rayon 
45 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau MOFCOM public notice. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/
ztxx/200904/20090406198805.html>. Access on: 18 Nov. 2010.
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also operates in two downstream markets of MMA, the dominance in the MMA 
market would likely cause foreclosure effects and restrict access to MMA by do-
wnstream competitors of the merged entity. 
To address those concerns, MOFCOM decided to impose certain condi-
tions, including: Lucite’s Chinese subsidiary, Lucite China is required to divest 50% 
of its annual MMA production capacity for five years; the China operations of Lu-
cite China’s and Mitsubishi Rayon’s MMA businesses must be managed separately, 
from the closing of the proposed transaction to the completion of the divestiture; 
and for five years from the closing of the transaction, the merged entity may not 
acquire producers or build new plants in China that manufacture MMA monomer, 
PMMA polymer, or cast sheet products, absent MOFCOM’s prior approval.
In contrast to the InBev/Anheuser-Busch case, this decision is based on affir-
mative findings of adverse effects of the merger on competition in the Chinese 
market. However, the decision offers no explanation about how the imposed con-
ditions, for example the divestiture of 50% of Lucite China’s production capacity 
for a period of five years, can “adequately cure”46 the anticompetitive impact of 
the transaction. As with the InBev/Anheuser-Busch decision, it also seeks to con-
trol future strategic activities by the merged entity. The effects of those conditions 
appear to be similar to that of InBev/Anheuser-Busch, that is, to restrict the growth 
of foreign competitors. Only that in this case the restriction has a term of five years. 
4.2.4 GM/Delphi
On September 28, 2009, MOFCOM conditionally approved the proposed 
acquisition of Delphi by General Motors (“GM”), a transaction involving two U.S. 
46 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau MOFCOM public notice. Paragraph 7. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/ztxx/200904/20090406198805.html>. Access on: 21 Nov. 2010.
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companies.47 Considering “GM’s leading position in the global and Chinese auto-
mobile manufacture markets, and the leading position and growth of Delphi in the 
global and Chinese auto parts markets”, MOFCOM stated concerns that the mer-
ger would be likely to eliminate or restrict competition in the Chinese automobile 
market and its upstream auto parts market.48 
MOFCOM decided to clear the merger subject to the following restricti-
ve conditions: the parties must ensure the stability, price and quality of supply to 
other domestic automakers supplied by Delphi; Delphi may not disclose to GM 
any competitive confidential information of other domestic automakers, and the 
parties may not exchange competitive confidential information of third parties; 
Delphi will assist in the smooth switching of suppliers by its customers; and GM 
must continue to procure auto parts from multiple sources on a non-discrimina-
tory basis and must not unreasonably favor Delphi over its competitors. 
Car manufacturing in China is a protected industry dominated by SOEs 
and foreign shareholding in any joint venture in this industry cannot exceed 50%. 
The decision clearly attempts to protect domestic automakers against any potential 
anticompetitive behavior by the merger entity. 
4.2.5 Pfizer/Wyeth
On September 29, 2009, a fourth clearance decision was delivered concer-
ning a transaction between two U.S. pharmaceutical companies, the proposed ac-
quisition of Wyeth by Pfizer.49 MOFCOM concluded that the merger would raise 
47 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau MOFCOM public notice. Paragraph 7. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/ztxx/200909/20090906540211.html>. Access on: 21 Nov. 2010.
48 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau MOFCOM public notice. Paragraph 7. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/ztxx/200909/20090906540211.html>. Access on: 25 Nov. 2010. 
49 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau MOFCOM public notice. Available at: <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/
b/c/200910/20091006544714.html>. Access on: 28 Nov. 2010.
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competition concerns on the market for swine mycoplasma pneumonia vaccine 
in China. According to the decision, the two parties would hold a market share of 
49.4% after the merger, significantly higher than that of any other competitor. As a 
result, the merged company would be capable of taking advantage of its scale and 
control product prices. 
MOFCOM therefore required that Pfizer fulfill the following obligations as 
conditions to approve the merger: Pfizer must divest identified swine mycoplasma 
pneumonia vaccine business in the Chinese domestic market subject to procedu-
ral requirements and time limits set by MOFCOM; the business to be divested 
includes tangible and intangible assets that are necessary for the viability and com-
petitiveness of such business; and within three years of the divestment and upon 
the buyer’s request, Pfizer has the obligation to provide the buyer with reasonable 
technical support and related assistance.
The Pfizer/Wyeth decision seems to repeat the presumption that a high ma-
rket share automatically leads to a dominant position, which is the primary basis 
for a finding of anticompetitive effects. 
4.2.6 Panasonic/Sanyo
On October 30, 2009, MOFCOM granted conditional clearance for the pro-
posed acquisition of Sanyo by Panasonic, two Japanese firms.50 Through its review, 
MOFCOM determined that the acquisition would harm competition on three al-
ready highly concentrated battery markets because both parties had a high market 
share leading to a dominant position in these markets. 
According to the decision, the merging parties are obliged to divest a sig-
nificant portion of their existing businesses relating to the three markets. They are 
50 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau MOFCOM public notice. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/
zcfb/200910/20091006593175.html>. Access on: 28 Nov. 2010.
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required to find independent buyers for those assets to be divested, and must find 
the qualified purchasers within six months upon MOFCOM’s approval, with a pos-
sible extension for another six months, again subject to MOFCOM’s approval. In 
addition, Panasonic committed to reducing its shareholding in a Panasonic-Toyota 
joint venture from 40% to 19.5% and relinquish certain management rights in the 
joint venture. 
Unlike the previous decisions, in which the relevant geographical market 
is explicitly or implicitly defined as the Chinese market, this case set the analysis 
in the context of the world market, and most of the businesses to be divested in 
this case are in Japan. It does not specify to what degree the proposed transaction 
would negatively affect the Chinese market and how the restrictive conditions will 
remedy it. 
4.2.7 Novartis/Alcon
On August 13, 2010, MOFCOM conditionally approved the proposed acqui-
sition by Swiss pharmaceutical company Novartis of Alcon, a global medical com-
pany specializing in eye care products that is also incorporated in Switzerland. 51 
MOFCOM found that the transaction may have the effect of eliminating or 
restricting competition in ophthalmic anti-inflammatory/anti-infective compoun-
ds market and contact lens care markets, due to high or leading combined market 
shares. To address those concerns, MOFCOM and the notifying parties agreed on 
two remedy measures, that Novartis is required to cease sales of its own anti-in-
flammatory/anti-infective compounds products in China by the end of 2010 and 
the restriction will last for 5 years from the date of the decision; and Novartis must 
terminate its strategic partnership with Haicheng, which has the biggest market 
share of contact lens care products in China, within 12 months of the decision. 
51 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau. MOFCOM public notice. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/
ztxx/201008/20100807080639.html>. Access on: 28 Nov. 2010. 
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Notably, the requirement that Novartis withdraw its anti-inflammatory/
anti-infective eye-care products from the China market was made despite the fact 
that Novartis had a very small market share, admittedly less than 1%, in the rele-
vant market. In addition, Novartis had already committed, as part of the transac-
tion, to effect such a withdrawal. With no explanation offered in the decision, the 
justification for MOFCOM’s concerns can be questionable. 
5 Concluding remarks
In a press conference to commemorate the two-year anniversary of the 
AML in relation to the enforcement work of MOFCOM, 52the Director General 
of AMB reiterated the agency’s position that AML applies non-discriminatorily 
to SOEs, private firms and foreign companies alike.53 Ironically, the very next day, 
MOFCOM published yet another and the latest conditional clearance decision in 
Novartis/Alcon, which only added to doubts that the enforcement agency has par-
ticularly targeted foreign companies. Of the more than 140 notifications that MO-
FCOM received during the first two years after the AML entered into force,54 all 
but seven were unconditionally cleared. The single prohibition decision concerned 
a foreign takeover of the largest domestic player in the relevant market, while all 
the six conditional clearance decisions applied to M&As outside China between 
foreign multinationals.
52 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau. The news report of this news conference. Available at: <http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/
aarticle/xxfb/201008/20100807077394.html>. Access on: 28 Nov. 2010.
53 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau. The transcript of the questions and answers during this press conference. 
Available at: <http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2010-08/12/content_1678211.htm>. Access on: 28 
Nov. 2010.
54 The latest reported statistics show that as of June 2010, MOFCOM received more than 140 
notifications.
 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly Bu-
reau. The transcript of the questions and answers during this press conference. Available 
at: <http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2010-08/12/content_1678211.htm>. Access on: 30 Nov. 2010.
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One official explanation is that the percentage of notifications involving 
multinationals is large because their annual turnover is sufficiently high to meet 
the filing thresholds.55 While it is true that foreign companies have an oversized 
presence in many sectors, for the antitrust authorities this seems to pose more a 
threat to the growth of Chinese firms rather than to market competition. This is 
not only evidenced by the two-year AML enforcement record, with the arguably 
small sample of seven decisions, but by the existence of a preceding merger review 
system established in 2003 that only applied to foreign acquisitions. 
Even assuming that all the seven decisions have been taken on valid com-
petition grounds, the fact that not one M&A between Chinese firms has been the 
subject of adverse decision might bear testimony to the underenforcement of the 
current merger control regime. Over a hundred of “national champion” firms have 
grown substantially as a result of massive restructuring such as M&As in the most 
important industries that the state still monopolizes.56 Given that the number of 
mergers between Chinese firms notified to MOFCOM is not publicly known, it is 
hard to assess the agency’s approach. But some of those transactions that meet the 
mandatory notification requirement are not even notified to MOFCOM. A par-
ticularly notable case in this category is the merger between China Unicom and 
China Netcom in October 2008, two of China’s leading telecommunications com-
panies.57 In this context, the more effectively the merger control rules are applied 
to foreign companies, the more the system is skewed in favour of domestic firms, 
especially the SOEs. 
55 CHINA. Ministry of Commerce of the People´s Republic of China. Anti-monopoly 
Bureau. The transcript of the questions and answers during this press conference. supra 
note 53. Available at: <http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2010-08/12/content_1678211.htm>. 
Access on: 30 Nov. 2010.
56 For example, see ECONOMY WATCH. China advertises globally for national champion 
CEOS. Available at: <http://www.economywatch.com/in-the-news/china-advertises-
globally-for-national-champion-ceos-19-09.html> Access on: 30 Nov. 2010).
57 RELATED news release. Available at: <http://www.cs.com.cn/ssgs/02/200809/
t20080917_1587421.htm>. Access on: 30 Nov. 2010.
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In summary, from its inception, China’s merger control regime has been 
shaped by considerations and priorities unique to its stage of economic develo-
pment. As a large emerging economy, China has benefited tremendously from 
foreign investment over three decades, which at the same time contributed to a 
market structure in which foreign companies dominates many sectors vis-à-vis 
fledging local firms. Chinese authorities appear to have first designed a merger re-
view system specifically to address this concern and subsequently applied neutral 
AML provisions more aggressively to foreign multinationals. This obviously is not 
only of great concern to foreign investors interested in China’s market, but also 
will have significant long-term impact on China’s evolving antitrust law, the overall 
legal system, economic development and further integration with the world. 
O regime do controle de fusão da China em face da integração 
global: caracteristicas e implicações
Resumo
Desde que o regime do controle de fusão da China foi estabelecido pela Lei 
Anti-Monopólio (AML) em 2008, o resultado da aplicação desta lei causou uma 
preocupação crescente, pois o sistema seria inerentemente contrário às empresas 
multinacionais estrangeiras. Este artigo realiza uma análise da evolução do sis-
tema de controle de fusões na China, avaliando seu papel e suas implicações. O 
desenvolvimento econômico constante da China, abastecido principalmente pe-
los investimentos estrangeiros, conduziu a um mercado interno caracterizado por 
uma forte presença estrangeira. A concorrência estrangeira e nacional tornou-se 
assim um assunto de relevância para os responsáveis políticos, especialmente em 
antecipação da entrada da China na Organização Mundial do Comércio. Esta pre-
ocupação precipitou o estabelecimento, em 2003, do primeiro sistema de revisão 
de fusões, o qual aplicava-se somente às fusões e aquisições por e entre empre-
sas estrangeiras. Embora a Lei AML em príncipio se aplique tanto em relação às 
empresas estrangeiras quanto às empresas chinesas, as autoridades reguladoras 
intervieram somente em aquisições estrangeiras. O regime de contrôle de fusão 
da China é diferente dos regimes das economias de mercado amadurecidas e tem 
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implicações significativas para si mesmo assim como para os investidores estran-
geiros.
Palavras-chaves: China. Controle de fusão. Integração global. Concorrência na-
cional e estrangeira.
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